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The Relative Efficiency of Skilled Labor across




I study how the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill labor varies across coun-
tries. Using micro data for countries at different stages of development, I document that
differences in relative quantities and wages are consistent with high-skill workers being
relatively more productive in rich countries. I exploit variation in the skill premia of
foreign-educated migrants to discriminate between two possible drivers of this pattern:
cross-country differences in the skill bias of technology and in the relative human capital
of skilled labor. I find that the former is quantitatively more important, and discuss the
implications of this result for development accounting.
JEL Classification: O11, O47, I25, E24
A question of major interest in macroeconomics is how the structure of production varies
across countries. The traditional view is that rich and poor countries are set apart by large differ-
ences in a factor-neutral productivity shifter, while gaps in the relative amount and productivity
of various factors of production are of more limited importance (Hall and Jones, 1999). Re-
cently, this view has been challenged, owing both to improved measurements of production
inputs (Schoellman, 2012; Lagakos et al., 2016) and richer characterizations of the production
technology (Jones, 2014a; Caselli, 2016).
An emerging view in this line of research is that the relative efficiency of high- and low-
skill workers varies substantially across countries (Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Caselli, 2016;
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Malmberg, 2018). This conclusion typically follows from the analysis of quantities and prices.
In a world with imperfect substitutability, a higher relative supply of skilled labor should be re-
flected in a lower relative price. However, existing estimates for the skill premium display lim-
ited variability across countries, despite large gaps in enrollment rates and educational achieve-
ments. This suggests that high-skill workers are, in relative terms, much more productive in
rich (and skill-abundant) countries, attenuating the downward pressure on the skill premium
stemming from their high supply.
Two broad interpretations have been proposed to explain this pattern. On one hand, the pro-
ductive environment in rich and poor countries might be differentially complementary to high-
and low-skill workers (the “relative technology” interpretation). This might be because firms
in rich countries adopt technologies more suitable for skilled workers, as proposed in Caselli
and Coleman (2006), or, more generally, because features such as the institutional setting or
sectoral composition differentially affect the productivity of high- and low-skill labor. On the
other hand, as proposed in Jones (2014a), the gap in embodied human capital between high- and
low-skill workers might be larger in rich countries, because of differences in educational qual-
ity, training or workers’ intrinsic characteristics (the “relative human capital” interpretation).
This distinction led to substantial disagreement on the role of human capital in development
accounting (Caselli and Ciccone, 2019; Jones, 2019). Depending on which interpretation is
chosen, differences in the relative human capital of high-skill labor can explain from virtually
none (under the “relative technology” interpretation) to all (under the “relative human capital”
interpretation) of the the cross-country variation in economic performance.
In this paper I re-examine the measurement and intepretation of cross-country differences
in relative skill efficiency. Using comparable micro-data for 12 countries at different levels
of development, I show that gaps in the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill labor are
sizable and, to a large extent, not driven by composition effects or other measurement issues.
Building on this finding, I use data on foreign educated immigrants across several host countries
to separately identify the role of the productive environment and embodied human capital in
explaining the cross-country variation in relative skill efficiency.
The measurement contribution of the paper consists in the construction of comparable esti-
mates for the two key inputs necessary for the calculation of relative skill efficiency: the skill
premium and the relative supply of skilled labor. For the skill premium, previous work relies on
imputations from meta-collections of estimated Mincerian returns, which tend to be scarcely
comparable across countries and often at odds with the postulated human capital aggregator
(which typically does not imply a log-linear relationship between wages and years of school-
ing). The relative supply of skilled labor is normally constructed from data on educational
attainment in the working age population, therefore ignoring any cross-country variation in the
employment rates and labor supply of high- and low-skill workers. I estimate the skill premium
using the same specification and sample restrictions for all countries, and I compute the relative
supply using actual information on employment status and hours worked.
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Through the lens of a simple production function setting, I back out the relative efficiency
of skilled labor for each country. I embed in this framework differences in both relative human
capital and skill-bias of technology, and show that the estimated relative skill efficiency is a
composite of the two. I confirm that relative skill efficiency is strongly increasing with GDP per
worker. The measurement refinements I introduce have countervailing effects on the magnitude
of these cross-country gaps: while the skill premium varies more across countries than what
can be inferred from Mincerian returns (implying less dispersion in relative skill efficiency),
accounting for the labor supply margin leads to larger gaps in the relative supply of skilled labor
(implying more dispersion in relative skill efficiency). Moreover, I leverage the individual-level
information available in my dataset to show that, to a large extent, cross-country gaps in relative
skill efficiency are not driven by differences in sectoral composition, in the incidence of self-
employment or in the returns to other observable characteristics, such as gender and experience.
I then study the interpretation of the cross-country variation in relative skill efficiency. My
approach is based on the analysis of migrant workers, educated in their countries of origin
but observed in the same labor market. I extend the baseline framework to allow for the fact
that workers educated in different countries might have different human capital endowments,
and differentially so depending on their level of educational attainment. Gaps in the relative
human capital of skilled labor might reflect differences in educational quality, as emphasized
in Schoellman (2012), or differential sorting into higher education across countries. In this
setting, the variation in skill premia across countries of origin and host countries allows to
discriminate between the “relative human capital” and “relative technology” interpretations
of relative skill efficiency. Intuitively, foreign-educated migrants employed in the same host
country are exposed to an equally skill-biased technological and institutional environment, and
cross-nationality differences in the skill premium identify differences in the relative human
capital endowment of high-skill labor. Moreover, for a given country of origin, differences
in the skill premium across host countries are informative on differences in the skill bias of
technology and the relative price of high-skill labor.
I find that the relative human capital of skilled labor accounts for a minor share - 5% to 18%,
with a baseline estimate of 9% - of the cross-country variation in relative skill efficiency. This
result is driven by the fact that cross-nationality differences in the wage gap between high-
and low-skill immigrants in the same host country are much smaller than the corresponding
cross-country differences in relative skill efficiency. I consider several threats to the validity of
a strategy based on migrants for cross-country inference: differential selection into migration,
skill loss upon migration and differential sorting into sectors or local labor markets. I show
that accounting for these possibilities does not majorly affect the quantitative conclusions of
the paper and, if anything, tends to lower the contribution of relative human capital. As a
validation exercise, I also document that the estimated variation in relative human capital is
roughly in line with what can be inferred, for a smaller set of countries, from differences in the
relative performance of high- and low-educated adults in standardized tests.
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I conclude the paper by discussing the implications for development accounting. I use the
migrant-based estimates to implement a simple counterfactual exercise, where a poor country
is assigned the quantity and relative human capital of high- and low-skill labor observed in a
rich country. I emphasize two key results. First, the income gains for the poor country are
limited, only marginally larger than what would be obtained by assuming no cross-country
variation in relative human capital, as in Caselli and Ciccone (2019). This implies that large
cross-country differences in average human capital require large uniform differences across
skill levels (i.e. all workers, irrespectively of the skill level, having more human capital in rich
countries), as opposed to relative, putting important restrictions on the possible sources of these
gaps. Second, differently from Jones (2014a), the results are largely invariant to the value of the
elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skill labor. Once the one-to-one link between
relative skill efficiency and relative human capital is broken, imperfect substitutability does not
amplify the role of human capital in development accounting.
My work fits within the literature on cross-country differences in the structure of produc-
tion. The basic approach to isolate skill-biased differences in productivity is introduced by
Caselli and Coleman (2006), and subsequently updated by Caselli (2016). Malmberg (2018)
proposes an alternative methodology, based on trade data, to infer cross-country differences
in the efficiency of skilled labor, and discusses the implications for development accounting.
Compared to these papers, my main contributions are (i) a richer account of the cross-country
gaps in relative skill efficiency, made possible by the use of cross-country micro-level data,
and (ii) a migrant-based decomposition of relative human capital and technology as sources of
these gaps.1 The second exercise relates to Okoye (2016), which uses the Mincerian returns
for US immigrants estimated in Schoellman (2012) to discipline the cross-country variation in
relative human capital in the context of a model with imperfect substitutability between skill
groups and skill-biased technology adoption. My work differs in terms of both empirical im-
plementation and focus of the analysis. Methodologically, I add to Okoye (2016) by using skill
premia estimated from micro data from multiple countries, by computing a decomposition of
the cross-country variation in relative skill efficiency and by quantifying the effects of several
possible confounders associated with a migrant-based identification strategy. Moreover, while
Okoye (2016) focuses on the extent to which poor countries face barriers to the adoption of
skill-specific technologies, I use my decomposition results to shed light the ongoing debate on
the role of human capital and imperfect substitutability in development accounting.
This paper also belongs to a growing literature studying migrants’ wages to learn about
cross-country differences in average human capital (Schoellman, 2012, 2016; Lagakos et al.,
2016; Hendricks and Schoellman, 2018, 2020). Compared to these papers, my work isolates the
role of the relative human capital endowment of high- and low-skill workers, whose quantitative
1The distinction between the relative human capital and technology mirrors, on a cross-country dimension,
a corresponding debate on the causes of the rise of the skill premium over time (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002; Bowlus
and Robinson, 2012; Hendricks and Schoellman, 2014).
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importance is the subject of an open debate (Caselli and Ciccone, 2019; Jones, 2019). As I
discuss in Section V, my findings can be combined with the existing evidence on migrants’
labor market outcomes to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the cross-country
variation in human capital and technology.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the data I use in this study. Section
II introduces the basic framework and describes the measurement of relative skill efficiency.
Section III discusses the migrant-based quantification, while Section IV discusses potential
identification concerns and the robustness of the results. Section V illustrates the implications
for development accounting, and Section VI concludes by discussing further implications and
directions for future work.
I Data
The primary data source for the paper is a collection of nationally representative Census data
harmonized by IPUMS and IPUMS International (Ruggles et al., 2019; Minnesota Population
Center, 2019). I consider all countries with at least one cross-section of data in 1990-2010, and
available information on wages or earnings, education, labor market status, gender, experience
and sector of employment. This leaves 26 cross-sections from 12 countries, including (ac-
cording to the World Bank classification) high-income (United States, Canada, Israel, Trinidad
and Tobago), upper middle-income (Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, Jamaica)
and lower middle-income (Indonesia, India) countries. In what follows, I refer to these 12
countries as the “micro-data sample”. For most of the analysis, I focus on the cross-sections
from 2000 or the closest available year within each country (results for other cross-sections are
reported in Appendix B).
For wage employed workers, I construct hourly wages from available information on annual
or weekly wages and hours worked. The information on hours worked is not available for India
and Panama; for these countries, I simply use weekly wages (as opposed to hourly) to estimate
skill premia and counts of employed workers (as opposed to hours worked) to calculate labor
stocks. Whenever the underlying Census includes the necessary information, I also construct
a measure of hourly or weekly self-employment income, which I use for a robustness check.
I classify all employed workers into five levels of educational attainment: primary or less,
lower secondary, upper secondary, some tertiary and tertiary completed. I define (potential)
experience as the difference between current age and age at the end of education, using data
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017) to infer the country-
specific duration of each education stage. Additional details on the construction of the key
variables can be found in Appendix A.
Within four of the countries in the micro-data sample (Brazil, Canada, Israel and United
States), I observe foreign-born and foreign-educated individuals from a total of 102 countries
of origin, satisfying a number of sample restrictions dicussed in Section III. I refer to these 102
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countries - for which I am able to construct estimates of the relative human capital endowment
of high-skill labor - as the “broad sample”. For all countries, I measure real GDP per worker in
PPP terms from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015).
II Measuring Relative Skill Efficiency
This section documents how the relative efficiency of skilled labor varies across countries. I
start by introducing a general framework, which I use to illustrate the nature of the empirical
exercise and to fix the terminology used in the rest of the paper. I then discuss the baseline
exercise, followed by a number of extensions.
II.A Framework
Throughout the paper, I consider variants of the production technology
Yc “ AcF pAK,cKc, A1,cX1,c, . . . , AN,cXN,cq (1)
where c indexes countries, Kc is physical capital and X1c, . . . , XNc are different types of labor
services. In the baseline exercise, different types of workers correspond to different levels
of educational attainment; in a subsequent extension, I also differentiate them by gender and
experience. The production function involves several technological paramenters, potentially
varying across countries: Ac is total factor productivity, while AK,c, A1,c, . . . , AN,c are factor-
biased technological terms, augmenting physical capital and labor services.
The embodied productivity of workers is potentially different across labor types and across
countries. In particular, the amount of labor services supplied by labor type n is
Xn,c “ Qn,cX̃n,c (2)
where X̃N,c represents the number of hours worked by workers of type n employed in country
c, while Qn,c captures workers’ embodied productivity, i.e. the hourly amount of labor services
they provide. While A1,c, . . . , AN,c proxy for factors external to individuals, such as the avail-
able technologies and the features of the working environment,Q1,c, . . . , QN,c capture workers’
human capital, which is the result of both accumulated knowledge and innate characteristics.
Workers of type n in country c provide therefore An,cQn,c efficiency units. Workers’ effi-
ciency is a function of their human capital and the particular technology they have access to.
Consider two types of workers indexed byH and L. Under perfectly competitive labor markets,






FHpAK,cKc, A1,cX1,c, . . . , AN,cXN,cq
FLpAK,cKc, A1,cX1,c, . . . , AN,cXN,cq
(3)
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i.e. the product of the relative efficiency of workers of type H and L (AH,cQH,c
AL,cQL,c
) and the relative
price of an efficiency unit supplied by the two types. Equation (3) is the relationship I bring to
the data to measure the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill labor. In order to do that, I need
to (i) identify high- and low-skill workers, (ii) measure the corresponding wage ratio and (iii)
impose further structure to back out the relative price of high- and low-skill efficiency units. I
start from a baseline set of assumptions in the next section, and discuss several alternatives in
the following one.
II.B Baseline Specification
Setup. I follow Caselli and Coleman (2006) and most of the subsequent literature in consid-
ering a CES human capital aggregator of high- and low-skill labor, with physical capital and
labor assumed to be separable. More specifically,
Yc “ AcF rAK,cKc, G pAL,cLc, AH,cHcqs (4)
where the human capital aggregator G is given by











Here, Hc and Lc denote high-skill and low-skill labor services, and σ is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two. High- and low-skill labor services are given by the product of the
number of hours worked by each type and their human capital
Hc “ QH,cH̃c (6)
Lc “ QL,cL̃c (7)
















I refer to AH,cQH,c
AL,cQL,c
as the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill workers (or, for brevity,
relative skill efficiency). If σ ą 1, the empirically relevant case given the existing estimates
of the elasticity of substitution (Ciccone and Peri, 2005), a higher efficiency of skilled labor
raises the skill premium, conditional on factor supplies. The relative efficiency can vary across
countries because of differences in the skill bias of technology, AH,c
AL,c
, and differences in the
relative human capital of skilled labor, QH,c
QL,c
. In what follows, I normalize the relative efficiency
of skilled labor so that it is 1 for the United States.
Elasticity Notation. I summarize the cross-country variation of any quantity of interest Xc
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with the corresponding elasticity with respect to GDP per worker θX ” B logXcB log yc . Moreover, for
brevity I refer to the elasticities of relative skill efficiency as θAQ, of relative human capital as
θQ, of the skill bias of technology as θA, and of the skill premium as θW . From (8), the elasticity
of relative skill efficiency can be written as







Implementation. To bring this framework to the data, two key choices to be made are the
assigment of workers to the high- and low-skill categories and the calibration of the elasticity
σ. For my baseline, I consider high-skill all workers with some tertiary education, while indi-
viduals with at most upper secondary degrees are low-skill. This split is in the middle range of
what the literature has considered. For the elasticity of substitution, I rely on Ciccone and Peri
(2005), who provide a credibly identified estimate of σ “ 1.5 on US data. I perform robustness
checks on both choices in Section C and Appendix B.
Within each of the two skill categories, workers are perfect substitutes. They provide dif-
ferent quantities of efficiency units per hour depending on their educational attainment, as
captured (given the perfect substitutability assumption) by their relative wages. The aggrega-
tors H̃c (L̃c) are expressed in terms of equivalent hours supplied by tertiary (upper secondary)














where wH,c,n, wL,c,m, H̃c,n and L̃c,m denote the wages and total hours worked by high- and
low-skill workers with education levels n and m, with n P H “ {some tertiary, tertiary} and
m P L “ {primary, lower secondary, upper secondary}.2 For each country, I run a log-wage re-
gression with the five educational categories as controls on a sample of wage-employed workers
with a relatively high degree of labor market attachment (16 to 65 years-old, working at least
30 hours per week and, if this information is available, 30 weeks per year) and calculate all
wH,c,n’s and wL,c,m’s as the exponentials of the corresponding estimates. The skill premium
is then given by the wage ratio between baseline high- and low-skill workers. Finally, H̃c,n
and L̃c,m are computed by summing up the hours worked by all workers (including the self-
employed) in the relevant educational categories. With the country-specific estimates of H̃c
L̃c
and
2The within-skill-group differences in efficiency units can in principle be driven by a combination of embodied
human capital and education-specific technology. Indeed, strictly speaking here I am backing out the relative
efficiency of tertiary and upper secondary educated workers, but the magnitude of relative skill efficiency will in
general depend on the chosen baseline types of high- and low-skill workers. Appendix B.5.4 defines and quantifies
a measure of ”average” relative skill efficiency, which combines the relative efficiency of all high- and low-skill




at hand, I can back out AH,cQH,c
AL,cQL,c
from (8).
Comparison with Traditional Measurement. At this point it is useful to remind the reader
of the key differences with respect to the “traditional” measurement of relative skill efficiency
without micro data, as typically implemented in the literature (Caselli and Coleman, 2006;
Jones, 2014a). First, relative wages are typically imputed based on meta-collections of es-
timated Mincerian returns, or - given the lack of systematic cross-country variability in the
estimates in such collections - simply assuming a common Mincerian return of 10%. This
might be inaccurate for a number of reasons: (i) the estimates in these meta-collections are of-
ten scarcely comparable in terms of empirical specifications, sample size and composition; (ii)
imputing wages based on Mincerian returns ignores non-linearities in the relationship between
log wages and years of schooling, which are both natural in a setting with imperfect substitu-
tion between high- and low-skill workers and, according to the existing evidence, empirically
important (see for example Lemieux, 2006). Second, the supply terms H̃c,n and L̃c,m are con-
structed from data on the educational attainment of the working age population, as opposed
to hours worked by the employed. To the extent that there are cross-country differences in
the relative labor supply of high- and low-skill individuals, either on the extensive or intensive
margin, this might over- or under-estimate the cross-country variation in H̃c
L̃c
.
Results. The first three columns of Table I display the skill premia, relative skill supplies and
relative efficiencies for all countries in the micro-data sample. As summary statistics for the
cross-country variation, the last row reports the elasticities θW , θH̃{L̃ and θAQ.
[Table I here]
The skill premium is on average higher in poorer countries, but the range of its variation is
relatively modest. Coupled with the large gaps in the relative supply displayed in the second
column, this implies large cross-country differences in the relative efficiency of skilled labor
(third column). The magnitudes are striking: in this sample, a given increase in GDP per
worker is associated to a more than proportional increase in relative skill efficiency. The gap
with respect to the US ranges from a factor of 1.4 for Canada to a factor of 100 or more
for the poorest countries in the sample. Figure I displays graphically the strong and positive
relationship between relative skill efficiency and GDP per worker.
[Figure I here]
The last three columns of Table I deconstruct the differences with the traditional approach
for measuring relative skill efficiency. Columns 4 and 5 show the results when the relative
supply of skilled labor is constructed by counting employed workers as opposed to hours (col-
umn 4), and by counting working age individuals as opposed to employed workers (column
5). Ignoring the intensive and, especially, the extensive margins of labor supply leads to an
understatement of the cross-country dispersion in the relative supply of skilled labor, and, as a
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consequence, in the inferred relative skill efficiency. This is driven by systematic cross-country
differences in the skill-specific labor supply, illustrated in Figure II: (i) while all employed
workers tend to work fewer hours in rich countries compared to poor countries, this relation-
ship is (mildly) weaker for high-skill workers; (ii) the employment rate is increasing with GDP
per worker for the high-skill, and decreasing for the low-skill. The combination of (i) and (ii)
implies that the relative labor supply of working age high- and low-skill individuals is higher in
rich countries. This is consistent with the evidence reported in Bick et al. (2016) for a different
set of countries.
[Figure II here]
The last column of Table I fully replicates the “traditional” approach for measuring relative
skill efficiency on my data. These estimates are based on skill premia and labor stocks con-
structed assuming a common Mincerian return of 10% across all countries (and, as in column
5, using educational attainment in the whole working age population). The resulting cross-
country variation in relative skill efficiency is now slightly higher compared to the baseline
estimates in column 3. Assuming constant skill premia amplifies the differences in relative
efficiency because the skill premium is, in fact, negatively correlated with GDP per worker and
the relative supply of skilled labor. Appendix B.5.1 shows that country-specific estimates of
Mincerian coefficients from various sources also understate this negative correlation, and that
this is the case even when I use Mincerian returns estimated from the same IPUMS data used
for the baseline estimates of the skill premium. A reason for this is that in most countries re-
turns to schooling are in fact convex, and a higher prevalence of low-educated individuals in
the sample (as it is the case for the poorer countries) mechanically lowers the estimated linear
relationship between log wages and years of schooling.
Overall, these results imply that (i) the relative supply of skilled labor is more positively
correlated with GDP than what is suggested by educational attainment data, implying larger
cross-country gaps in relative skill efficiency for a given skill premium, and (ii) the skill pre-
mium is more negatively correlated with GDP than what suggested by Mincerian returns, im-
plying smaller cross-country gaps in relative skill efficiency. Since (ii) slightly dominates on
(i), the gaps in relative skill efficiency inferred with micro data are slightly smaller (though still
large in absolute terms) than the ones resulting from the traditional sources.
II.C Robustness
This section exploits the richness of the micro-level information in the IPUMS data to verify
the extent to which gaps in relative skill efficiency reflect compositional effects and other mea-
surement issues. For each exercise, I present the results in terms of elasticities with respect to
GDP per worker in Table II; country-specific results and more details on the implementation
can be found in Appendix B.
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[Table II here]
Experience and Gender. Row (2) of Table II shows the results when allowing for heterogene-
ity in terms of two additional observable characteristics: experience and gender. This is po-
tentially important as the demographic composition of high- and low-skill labor differs across
countries, and the wage returns to these observable characteristics have also been shown to
vary substantially across educational groups and with the level of development (Lagakos et al.,
2017). I compute skill premia and labor stocks under the assumption that workers within skill
groups are perfect substitutes, with their efficiency allowed to depend on potential experience
and gender (see Appendix B.1 for the details). Compared to the baseline estimates reported
in row (1), both the relative wage and the relative supply vary slightly less across countries;
the resulting relative skill efficiency is still substantially increasing with development, with a
marginally higher elasticity with respect to GDP per worker.
Self-Employment. It is well-known that self-employment is more widespread in poor coun-
tries compared to rich countries. While the self-employed enter in the computations of the
labor stocks, by construction they are not part of the specifications to estimate skill premia.
This might be problematic to the extent that the efficiency gap between high- and low-skill
individuals is different for self-employed and wage workers. To investigate this issue, I use
data on self-employment income, which is available for 8 countries in the micro-data sample
(Brazil, Canada, Israel, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, United States and Venezuela).
Naturally, this includes in principle payments to both capital and labor. However, it is use-
ful to have a sense of how much the conclusions of my exercise change if both wage and
self-employed income are used in the regressions estimating skill premia. To the extent to
which the highly-educated self-employed use more physical capital, these regressions might
overestimate skill premia relatively more in poor countries (where the self-employed are more
prevalent), therefore putting the odds against finding the result that relative skill efficiency is
higher in rich countries. Row (4) of Table II shows that the impact of this correction is in fact
minimal, and the elasticities are very similar to their baseline counterparts computed over the
same eight countries, reported in row (3).
Relative Skill Efficiency across Sectors. I next turn to the role of sectorial heterogeneity. It
is plausible that the production technology varies across sectors; at the same time, rich and
poor countries differ dramatically in their sectoral composition of employment. An interesting
question is therefore the extent to which the cross-country variation in “aggregate” relative skill
efficiency is driven by sectoral composition, as opposed to within-sector differences.3
To shed light on this, I postulate a sector-level production function. Suppose the production
3The exercise in this section is closely related to a number of papers that study the role of sectoral composition
in driving differences in the relative supply of skilled labor, either over time or across countries (Berman et al.,
1994, 1998; Machin and Reenen, 1998; Hendricks, 2010). Here I ask a similar question for cross-country gaps in
the inferred aggregate relative skill efficiency.
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where the sector-level elasticity of substitution is denoted by σ̃ (to distinguish it from the ag-
















As for the aggregate case, sector-specific relative skill efficiencies can be backed out using
sector-specific skill premia and labor stocks, as well as a calibrated value for the elasticity of
substitution.
I consider four broad sectors that can be consistently defined across all 12 countries in the
micro-data sample: agriculture, industry, low-skill services and high-skill services. The map-
ping between the IPUMS sectoral classification and these broader sectors follows Herrendorf
and Schoellman (2018). One complication arises from the fact that estimates of the aggre-
gate elasticity of substitution, such as the one in Ciccone and Peri (2005), are not directly
informative on the corresponding elasticity at the sector level. If sectors differ in skill inten-
sity, any estimate of the aggregate elasticity will partially reflect the reallocation of resources
across different sectors in response to a change in the skill premium. To calibrate σ̃, I apply
the theoretical results in Oberfield and Raval (2014), that derives a general mapping between
the aggregate and the micro-level elasticities of substitution among two factors of production.
This computation (illustrated in Appendix B.2) implies σ̃ “ 1.59, in fact close to the aggregate
elasticity.
Rows (5)-(8) of Table II show the sector-level results. Relative skill efficiency is strongly
increasing in GDP per worker within all sectors. This suggests that differences in sectorial
composition are not the main driver of the overall dispersion in relative skill efficiency. How-
ever, there are also cross-sector differences; the cross-country gap is largest in agriculture and
smallest in high-skill services, which is mostly driven by a stronger gradient of relative skill
supply in less skill-intensive sectors, such as agriculture.4 In Appendix B.2 I build on these
estimates to perform a simple counterfactual exercise that, imposing more structure on the de-
mand side of the model, quantifies the residual variation in relative skill efficiency if sectorial
employment shares were equalized across countries. The resulting θAQ is about 12% lower
than the baseline in Table II. This confirms that, while sectoral composition plays some role,
relative skill efficiency gaps are primarily a within-sector phenomenon.
4The country-specific results reported in Appendix B.6 show that within all countries relative skill efficiency
is highest in high-skill services and lowest in agriculture, with manufacturing and low-skill services displaying
intermediate values. However, as implied by the elasticities in Table II, these cross-sector differences are smaller
in richer countries.
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Elasticity of Substitution. I now illustrate how the results vary with the elasticity of substitu-
tion. The value of 1.5 is based on arguably the most credibly identified estimate in the literature,
exploiting exogenous variation in the relative supply of high-skill labor across US States (Ci-
ccone and Peri, 2005). This value is not far from alternative estimates based on US data: the
seminal paper by Katz and Murphy (1992) finds σ “ 1.41, while other estimates range between
1.3 and 2 (see the reviews in Autor et al., 1998; Ciccone and Peri, 2005).The last two columns
of Table II show the results for the two extremes of this range. The magnitude of θAQ is quite
sensitive to the value of σ, with more substitutability implying less dispersion in relative skill
efficiency. However, even for σ “ 2, cross-country differences are large, with the gap with
respect to the US ranging from a factor of 1.3 (Canada) to a factor of 17 (Indonesia).5
It is useful to highlight here the relationship with the elasticity estimated in Hendricks and
Schoellman (2020) and Bils et al. (2020). These papers show that models where the skill bias of
technology responds endogenously to the relative supply of high-skill labor are isomorphic to
a production function with no cross-country differences in the factor-biased technology terms
and a “long-run” elasticity of substitution, σLR. The elasticity σLR is necessarily larger than σ,
as it incorporates the postulated adjustment of AH,c{AL,c to differences in labor supply (treated
as exogenous); the larger the difference between σLR and σ, the more the endogenous skill bias
of technology varies across countries.6 I compute σLR as the σ that solves (9) when θA “ 0
(see Appendix B.3 for more details). Using the values of θW and θH̃{L̃ reported in Table I
and the baseline estimate of θQ presented in Section III, I find σLR “ 4.58, roughly in line
with Hendricks and Schoellman (2020) and Bils et al. (2020). Through the lens of models of
directed technology adoption, the high value of σLR compared to conventional estimates of σ
is a reformulation of the result of large cross-country gaps in relative skill efficiency.7
Different Production Technologies. Finally, I discuss how different specifications of the pro-
duction technology explored in the literature affect the interpretation of relative skill efficiency.
First, with capital-skill complementarity as in Krusell et al. (2000), the skill premium is in-
creasing in the stock of equipment capital, and the relative skill efficiency computed from (8)
incorporates a term reflecting this effect. Appendix B.4.1 includes a simple calibration exer-
cise suggesting that this margin can be quantitatively important, accounting for about half of
the cross-country dispersion in relative skill efficiency. This gives a particular underpinning
of skill-biased differences in the productive environment: rich countries are relatively more
abundant in the type of capital that is more complementary to high-skill labor.
5Appendix B.3 illustrates graphically the negative relationship between θAQ and σ implied by equation (9).
The value of σ for which θAQ reaches 0 is 6.60.
6The estimates of σ discussed above might indeed not incorporate part or all of the endogenous adjustments of
technology, either because they rely on short-run variation by controlling for trends (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992),
or perhaps because they use within-country variation (e.g., Ciccone and Peri, 2005), while technology responses
(especially the invention of new technologies) might affect the whole country.
7As I further discuss in the Conclusions, the quantitative importance of directed technological adoption vis-
à-vis other mechanisms for cross-country differences in the skill bias of technology is an important open question
for future work.
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Second, with differentiated tasks and an endogenous division of labor as in Jones (2014b),
cross-country differences in the organization of production might contribute to gaps in relative
skill efficiency. Appendix B.4.2 illustrates that in a stylized version of this model, the relative
skill efficiency computed from (8) depends on the degree of task specialization among high-
skill workers, which in turn might vary across countries due to institutional factors, differences
in factor supplies or multiple equilibria. While this is an intriguing possibility, in absence of
further information on the performed tasks even worker-level data are not sufficient for a proper
quantification of its importance.
Taking Stock. The results in this Section suggest that differences in relative skill efficiency are
not an artifact of basic measurement or compositional issues.8 Naturally, other relevant forces
might operate at a more granular level than the one considered here, and further insights might
come from the comparative analysis of finer micro-level data across countries. For example,
comparable data on the task content of high-skill occupations might allow to quantify the role
of the organization of production; moreover, firm-level data would allow to study the role of
sorting of high- and low-skill into different kinds of firms, which might in principle contribute
to the cross-country dispersion in “aggregate” relative skill efficiency. I leave these interesting
extensions for future work.
III Interpreting Relative Skill Efficiency
What explains the variation in relative skill efficiency across countries? This Section exploits
information on the skill premia of foreign-educated migrants to shed light on this question.
Setup. I modify the baseline framework in Section A by introducing a new dimension of
heterogeneity: the fact that some workers are educated in different countries. For clarity, I
abstract from educational careers spanning more than one country, and I consider only natives
and migrants entirely educated in their own country of origin.
The human capital of high- and low-skill workers depends on the country where their educa-
tion was acquired (indexed by a). This might reflect the quality of the educational environment,
but also the mechanisms according to which individuals with different baseline characteristics
sort into different levels of educational attainment. I do not take a stand on the source of embod-
ied productivity differences between high- and low-skill labor, which might also be different
across countries; I take as given their (possible) existence, and attempt to measure them in the
data. Within skill groups, services provided by workers of different nationalities are perfect
substitutes and augmented by the same technology. The production function takes the general
8Appendix B illustrates the implications of other robustness exercises, such as changing the definitions of
high- and low-skill labor or considering different time periods. These exercises do not change the substance of the
conclusion that relative skill efficiency is higher in rich countries.
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from in equation (4), reported here for convenience
Yc “ AcF rAK,cKc, G pAL,cLc, AH,cHcqs (14)

















where H̃ac and L̃
a
c are the numbers of (baseline equivalent) hours worked by high- and low-skill
workers educated in country a and employed in c. The terms εaH,c and ε
a
H,c capture idiosyncratic
factors affecting high- and low-skill immigrants from a in country c - including selection and
skill loss upon migration - making their productivity in country c larger or smaller than QH,a
and QL,a; for natives, εcH,c “ ε
c
L,c “ 1. For simplicity, I work under the assumption that
foreign-educated immigrants represent a small share of the labor force, so that population-wide
averages are well approximated by the corresponding averages among natives.
In a competitive labor market, the log wage ratio between high- and low-skill workers






















This expression highlights why the country of education represents a useful source of variation
for my purposes. All workers employed in country c face the same degree of technological skill
bias and relative price of high- and low-skill efficiency units, the combination of which can be
absorbed by a host country fixed effect. Moreover, human capital varies across countries of
origin, and the relative human capital of high- and low-skill labor is captured by a country of
origin fixed effect. Treating the pair-specific terms as random disturbances, one can quantify
cross-country differences in relative human capital by comparing skill premia within a given
host country. The key challenge is represented by the possibility that the pair-specific term
might vary systematically across countries of origin, and, in particular, be correlated with their
GDP per worker. I discuss several strategies to control for this possibility in what follows.
Implementation. To bring equation (17) to the data, I construct skill premia by country of ori-
gin for 4 host countries for which the IPUMS data records detailed information on immigrants:
Brazil, Canada, Israel and the United States.9 I implement the same sample restrictions as in
9These are the host countries in the IPUMS data for which all the following requirements are satisfied: (i)
available information on country of birth, (ii) on year of immigration, and (iii) at least two foreign nationalities
represented in the data, once all sample restrictions discussed below are applied. Some other countries in IPUMS
satisfy some but not all these requirements.
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Section II (16 to 65 years old wage-employed workers, working for at least 30 weeks and 30
hours per week in the previous year). To isolate the role of the country of education, I further
restrict the sample to natives and immigrants who arrived at least six years after the age at which
they should have ended their studies, given their level of educational attainment. For each host
country, I pool all available cross-sections and run a log-wage regression on education-specific
year and country of origin dummies; I then calculate waH,c and w
a
L,c as the exponentiated esti-
mates corresponding to tertiary and upper secondary educated workers. To account for basic
factors affecting immigrants’ productivity, I include as additional controls a cubic polynomial
in the number of years since migration and, when available, self-reported proficiency in the
local official language.10
I focus on 102 countries of origin with at least 50 upper secondary educated and 50 tertiary
educated workers in the sample (the “broad” sample). Most of these countries of origin are
represented in the US (101), while the other host countries have more limited coverage (11 in
Canada, 8 in Brazil, 6 in Israel). While relative human capital (and its elasticity θQ) can be
estimated for all 102 countries in the broad sample, the micro-data based estimates of relative
skill efficiency (and its elasticity θAQ) only cover the 12 countries considered in Section II. To
complement this, I also compute θAQ in the broad sample, using data on educational attainment
from Barro and Lee (2013) and imputing wages based on a common Mincerian return of 10%
(along the lines of the “traditional” approach described in Section IV).11 For σ “ 1.5, this gives
θAQ “ 1.107 (s.e. 0.145), a bit lower than the estimate for the micro-data sample in Table I. As
illustrated in Section II, this is not driven by measurement differences, which if anything tend
to make micro-data based estimates slightly less different across countries, but rather by sample
composition, as the rich countries in the micro-data sample have particularly high relative skill
efficiency. In light of this, the discussion that follows focuses on the comparison of θQ and θAQ
from the broader sample, though I also report results for the micro-data sample only.
Results - US Immigrants. I first present the results when focusing on the US as the only
host country. This is a useful starting point, as the US is by far the host country with the
largest diversity in immigrants’ nationalities; moreover, these results serve as a baseline for the
robustness analysis in Section IV, based on US data. From equation (17), the log difference














10Language proficiency is only available for US and Canada. In the US, respondents are asked to evaluate their
English proficiency on a scale from 1 to 4. In Canada, respondents indicate whether the know either, neither or
both English and French.
11The calculation of relative skill efficiency abstracts from the nationality composition of a country’s labor
force, which would in principle affect the effective relative skill supply if human capital endowments are indeed
country-of-origin-specific. Once again, this is based on the fact that foreign-educated workers represent a minority
of the labor force, and do not contribute much to country-wide averages of wages and human capital endowments.




is normalized to 1. This can be interpreted as a noisy estimate of relative human
capital for country a. Under the assumption - assessed extensively in Section IV - that the
difference between the US-specific productivity of high- and low-skill workers from a is un-
correlated with country a’s GDP, a regression of (18) on log ya recovers the elasticity of relative
human capital θQ.
Figure III displays the skill premium as a function of GDP in the country of origin. While
the correlation is positive, the range of variation is much smaller compared to the one of relative
skill efficiency. Consider for example Switzerland and Vietnam, the 90th and 10th percentiles of
the broad sample GDP distribution; the skill premium for Swiss-educated workers (1.81) is 1.22
times the skill premium for Vietnam-educated workers (1.48, a difference of 0.2 log points),
while relative skill efficiency in Switzerland is 16 times larger than in Vietnam (a difference
of 2.8 log points). Similar conclusions can be drawn for most pairwise comparisons between
rich and poor countries in Figure III. Indeed, row (1) of Table III shows that the resulting θQ
is 0.105, about 10% of the elasticity of relative skill efficiency θAQ in the broad sample for
σ “ 1.5. The Table also illustrates how the results vary with σ, which affects θAQ but not θQ;
for the range of elasticities estimated in the micro literature, relative human capital accounts
for a minority share of the variation in relative skill efficiency.
[Figure III and Table III here]
Results - All Host Countries. I then estimate (17) using all host countries, and regress the
resulting country of origin fixed effects on GDP per worker to recover θQ. Row (2) of Table
III shows that this gives θQ “ 0.098, accounting for about 9% of the elasticity of relative skill
efficiency. The results are very similar to the US-based ones; indeed, in Appendix C, I illustrate
that skill premia in all host countries are consistent with a θQ in that range or lower.







in (17), and would be collinear to country of origin fixed effects in
a single host country setting. I include sets of dummies identifying pairs of host and origin
countries that are sharing a border or an official language, as well as a third degree polynomial
in geographic distance between the two countries (all from the GeoDist dataset; see Mayer and
Zignago, 2011). As shown in row (3), this results in a slightly lower estimate for θQ in the
broad sample, not altering the key conclusion that relative human capital plays a minor role in
the variation of relative skill efficiency.
Interpreting the Host Country FE. The left panel of Figure IV displays the estimated host
country fixed effects from equation (17).12 They are mildly decreasing in GDP per worker,
with an elasticity of -0.17; keeping constant the relative human capital of high-skill labor,
captured by the country of origin fixed effect, richer countries have lower skill premia. As
12The host country fixed effect is identified for all 12 countries in the micro-data sample, given that in all of
them I observe at least one country of origin (including the country itself, for natives) observed in at least another
country.
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shown in equation (17), the host country fixed effect captures a combination of the skill bias
of technology and the relative price of high-skill efficiency units. These two components can
be separated with more structure on the production technology. The right panel of Figure IV
shows that the skill bias of technology implied by the human capital aggregator in equation
(5) with σ “ 1.5 is strongly increasing in GDP per worker.13 Intuitively, large cross-country
differences in relative supply imply that the relative price of high-skill efficiency units should
decline strongly with development, requiring large counteracting differences in the skill bias of
technology to rationalize the (less variable) host country fixed effects.
[Figure IV here]
Different Production Technologies. Appendix C.3 illustrates how alternative formulations
of the production technology change the interpretation of the host country fixed effect, while
broadly preserving the interpretation of the country of origin fixed effects. Under capital-skill
complementarity (Krusell et al., 2000), the host country fixed effects absorb differences in the
abundance of equipment capital, which increases the skill premium for all workers employed
in a given country; the country of origin fixed effects still capture relative human capital. In a
model with sorting of high-skill labor into differentiated tasks (Jones, 2014b), the host country
fixed effects absorb differences in the degree of task specialization, which affects the produc-
tivity of all high-skill workers; the country of origin fixed effects capture the relative human
capital embodied in high-and low-skill workers, keeping the extent of the division of labor con-
stant. An issue highlighted in such model is the extent of the skill transferability for immigrants
from countries with a different organization of production; any loss of productive skills would
be reflected in the pair-specific term in (17). The implications of this possibility are discussed
in Section B.
IV Robustness and Extensions
The migrant-based estimates suggest small cross-country differences in the relative human cap-
ital of high- and low-skill labor. This section subjects this conclusion to several robustness
checks. First, I exploit additional data on US immigrants to assess three potential concerns
for the migrant-based approach: selection into migration, low skill transferability and differen-
tial sorting into sectors or local labor markets.14 Second, I cross-validate the gaps in relative
human capital estimated out of migrants with those implied by a different source, i.e. adults’
performance in standardized tests.
13The host country fixed effect for country c is σσ´1 log pAH,c{AL,cq ´
1







which can be solved for log pAH,c{AL,cq. Naturally, given an estimate of relative human capital, the skill bias of
technology can also be computed as a residual from (8), using information on natives only. In Appendix C.2 I
show that the resulting values are very similar to those computed from the host country fixed effects.
14These exercises focus on US-based immigrants because for the other host countries some or all of the addi-
tional data I use are unavailable.
18
IV.A Selection
It is helpful to explicitly introduce individual-level heterogeneity to the framework of Section
III to illustrate the selection issue. Suppose that the human capital of individual i, of skill
S P tH,Lu, having completed his or her education in country a is QS,aεS,a,i, where εS,a,i is
an idiosyncratic factor capturing unobservable skills, with E rlog εS,a,is “ 0. Let mac,i be an
indicator taking value 1 when individual i is a migrant from a to c. If migrants to country c






‰ 0. In absence of other sources of
country-of-origin-specific productivity, the skill premium gap between immigrants from a and

























which is a particular specification of equation (18). Selection enters into the error term in (18)













Moreover, for the purpose of estimating θQ, differential selection is problematic if it is corre-
lated with GDP per worker in the country of origin. In particular, a negative correlation - i.e.
high-skill migrants from poor countries being more positively selected than low-skill migrants,
relative to the same comparison for rich countries - could in principle countribute to the low θQ
estimated in Section III.
The migration literature has widely established that migrants are non-randomly selected on
observable and unobservable skills (Borjas, 1987), and for the vast majority of origin coun-
tries the degree of selection of emigrants to the United States appears to be positive (Feliciano,
2005). The issue of relative selection by educational achievement, i.e. how, among individuals
educated in a given country, the degree of selection on unobservables of emigrants within the
low-skill group compares to the one within the high-skill group, has received far less atten-
tion. Recent evidence comes from Hendricks and Schoellman (2018), who construct measures
of selection on observable and unobservable skills based on the comparison of pre-migration
wages of migrants to the US and wages of non migrants from the same country. Among other
results, they report measures of selection by education, across bins of countries grouped by
GDP per worker. In my notation, their measures of selection on unobservables for college and

























I obtain the country-specific factor I need to correct for the selection bias in (19). Figure V
displays this measure of differential selection across the GDP levels reported in Hendricks and
Schoellman (2018). There does not appear to be any strong systematic pattern with respect to
the level of development; if anything, the richest countries display the highest degree of positive
differential selection, which would bias my approach towards finding a large θQ. Moreover,
across all GDP levels, the selection correction is an order of magnitude smaller compared to
the gaps in relative skill efficiency.
[Figure V here]
Row (4) of Table III shows the estimated θQ after the selection correction (where each
country is assigned the degree of differential selection corresponding to its GDP group).15 The
relative human capital endowment of skilled labor contributes now only 2-7% to the associa-
tion between relative skill efficiency and GDP per worker in the broad sample. This selection
correction is quite crude, and might miss some heterogeneity in differential selection within
GDP groups. However, these results do suggest that a reasonable degree of differential selec-
tion does not change the conclusion that relative human capital accounts for a limited part of
gaps in relative skill efficiency.
IV.B Skill Loss and Skill Downgrading
Another concern is that skills might be partially country-specific. Differences in language, cul-
ture and the organization of production, as well as a poor fit between the educational curriculum
and the needs of local employers could all imply a loss of productive skills upon migration. To
the extent that this takes place differentially across skill levels, this will be reflected in the error
term in equation (18), and might bias the estimate of θQ if it correlates with GDP per worker in
the country of origin.
To assess the importance of this, I re-compute (18) limiting the sample to US migrants that
are, according to obervable characteristics, less likely to be affected by a lack of US-specific
human capital. Row (5) and (6) of Table III display the estimated θQ based on, respectively,
migrants that have spent at least 10 years in the United States and migrants that report to
speak English well. In both cases, the cross-nationality variation in skill premia and, as a
consequence, in the inferred relative human capital of high-skill labor is somewhat smaller
compared to the baseline case. This is consistent with the fact that poorer countries tend to
be linguistically, institutionally and culturally more distant from the United States, making it
harder for immigrants from those countries to fully utilize their skills.16
15I do not apply any selection correction to the estimate of relative human capital endowment for the United
States, since when limiting the analysis to US-based workers this is identified out of natives.
16Schoellman (2012) implements a similar exercise for Mincerian returns, and similarly finds that limiting the
sample to immigrants more and less abundant in US-specific human capital has a small impact on the dispersion
of the estimated returns across countries of origin.
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A more subtle issue is that some high-skill immigrants might effectively be employed as
low-skill workers, and therefore be exposed to the low-skill augmenting technology and factor-
specific price. This could reflect either barriers immigrants face when accessing high-skill jobs
or, as emphasized in Jones (2014b), an optimal occupational choice given low skill transfer-
ability. For my purposes, this pattern can be problematic, since when comparing skill premia
across nationalities as in (18) the technological and price terms would not fully cancel out.
To explore this issue, I rely on a proxy for the skill content of workers’ activities based on
their occupational title. In particular, I define an occupation as high- or low-skill based on the
most frequent skill level among US natives in that occupation, and identify workers subject to
“skill downgrading” as the high-skill employed in a low-skill occupation.17 Figure VI shows
that the incidence of skill downgrading does vary somewhat across countries of origin: on
average, about 37% immigrants from countries in the lowest quartile of the GDP distribution
are subject to it, while the corresponding figure across US natives is 17%.
[Figure VI here]
As a rough check on the implications of this for my results, I re-compute (18) excluding
all skill-downgraded workers (either natives or immigrants) from the sample. Row (7) of Table
III shows that this results in a slightly lower estimate of θQ.18 Of course, this exercise is
plausibly affected by a selection bias as, conditionally on educational attainment, immigrants
employed in high-skill occupations are likely to differ in terms of unobservable characteristics
from those employed in low-skill occupations. However, the small difference between the
estimates on the restricted and baseline samples and the fact that, for most countries of origin,
the skill-downgraded represent a minority of high-skill workers, suggest that it is unlikely that
accounting for this type of selection would substantially increase the cross-country variation in
relative human capital.
IV.C Sorting
The comparison of skill premia across nationalities identifies relative human capital gaps if mi-
grants use the same technology and face the same relative price of high- and low-skill efficiency
units. This might not be the case if, within a given host country, workers educated in different
countries sort into labor markets that systematically differ along these dimensions.
I study two sources of within-country heterogeneity: sectors and regions. Consider first an
17This exercise uses occ1990, an occupation coding scheme harmonized across Census years by IPUMS,
including almost 400 occupations. I repeat the skill intensity calculation separately for each year, and use the
year-specific results to classify workers as skill-downgraded.
18This classification of high- and low-skill occupation implies that several (education-wise) low-skill workers
are employed in high-skill occupations. When I estimate skill premia removing these workers from the sample as
well, the resulting θQ is 0.093.
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environment with a sector-specific production technology,
Yc,s “ Ac,sF pAK,c,sKc,s, AL,c,sLc,s, AH,c,sHc,sq (23)
where Hc,s and Lc,s are sector-specific aggregates of high- and low-skill labor services. The
wage ratio between high- and low-skill workers educated in country a and employed in sectors























Equation (24) illustrates how differential sorting can bias my empirical approach. On one hand,
skill premia vary across nationalities if high-skill and low-skill workers differentially sort into
sectors with different levels of revenue total factor productivity. This implies a sector-specific
component in wages, which can be identified by a sector fixed effect in a log-wage regression.
On the other hand, migrants could be differentially sorting into sectors with different skill bias
of technology or relative prices of high- and low-skill efficiency units, which would imply
sector-specific skill premia.
To evaluate the importance of these possibilities, I estimate the nationality-specific skill
premia controlling for sector and sector ˆ skill fixed effects, which absorb the sector-level
terms highlighted in equation (24), and regress them on log GDP to recover θQ.19 Row (8) of
Table III shows the results. Allowing for sectoral heterogeneity has a small negative effect on
the cross-country variation of relative human capital. While, as discussed in Section C, sectors
are heterogeneous in terms of technology and skill prices, the allocation of migrants across
sectors does not appear to be strongly related to these factors.
The last row of Table III reports the results of the corresponding exercise by region. I
estimate skill premia net of skill-specific commuting zones fixed effects, constructed as in
Autor and Dorn (2013). Commuting zones are commonly regarded as separate local labor
markets, and as such should be well-suited to capture the spatial variation in the relative price
of high- and low-skill efficiency units. The impact of this adjustment on the estimated θQ is
once again small and negative.
IV.D Validation with Test Scores Data
This section investigates if measures of relative human capital based on international standard-
ized tests are consistent with the conclusions of the migrant-based approach. I use data from the
OECD’s PIAAC programme (OECD, 2016), which includes nationally representative surveys
19I make full use of the sectoral classification available in the US Census and harmonized across years by
IPUMS (ind1990), consisting of 243 different sectors.
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of adult skills for 34 countries, collected in the 2011-2017 period.20 I focus on the numeracy do-
main, and standardize scores to have an average of 0 and an individual-level standard deviation
of 1 when pooling all countries (see Appendix A for more details on the data construction).
Figure VII plots the difference between the average score attained by college and high
school educated workers against GDP per worker in 2014. High-skill individuals perform rela-
tively better in richer countries, though differences in relative performance amount to fractions
of an individual-level standard deviation (the slope of the relationship is 0.136). To evaluate
the implications for relative human capital, I follow the development accounting literature in
postulating a log-linear mapping between human capital and test scores, logQS,c “ βTS,c,
where TS,c is the average test score for skill group S P tL,Hu in country c. The parameter β
is pinned down by the wage increase associated to a standard deviation increase in test scores;
a wage regression in the pooled sample (conditional on country fixed effects) gives pβ “ 0.203,
consistently with Hanushek et al. (2015). The implied elasticity of relative human capital is
then θQ “ 0.203ˆ0.136 “ 0.028, somewhat smaller than the migrant-based estimates in Table
III.
[Figure VII here]
Naturally, test scores might fail to capture relevant dimensions of human capital, possibly
differentially so across skill levels. Moreover, the PIAAC sample does not include very poor
countries. The migrants-based estimates in Section III are preferable on both these accounts.
On the other hand, this exercise is not subject to the migrant-related concerns discussed above.
Overall, it is encouraging that these two different strategies point to a similar conclusion: the
relative human capital of high-skill labor increases only mildly with development.
V Implications for Development Accounting
This section illustrates the implications of my results for the ongoing debate on the role of
human capital in development accounting. Following Klenow and Rodrı́guez-Clare (1997), I


















where Zc captures TFP and capital intensity, and the size of the labor force is normalised to 1.
Consider a poor (P ) and a rich (R) country. A question of interest in development accounting
20Kaarsen (2014) and Bils et al. (2020) consider related exercises, exploiting the variation in standardized test
performance across students attending consecutive grades. Focusing on test scores of adults with different levels
of educational attainment allows me to avoid any assumption on the relationship between performance and years
of schooling (which might be non linear), as well as to account for patterns of selection into higher education
(which could in principle contribute to the cross-country variation in QH,c{QL,c).
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is: how much would the poor country’s income grow if it was assigned the human capital of



















Using the expressions for the equilibrium skill premia, the counterfactual GDP ratio between





































where, for ease of reference to the results in Section III, I write relative human capital in terms





{ log pyR{yP q.22 The counterfactual GDP ratio is large
when there are large differences in the relative human capital endowment of high-skill labor, as
captured by θQ. Moreover, the ratio also increases with uniform gaps in human capital across
skill levels, as captured, for a given θQ, by the QL,R{QL,P term.
In absence of an estimate for θQ, previous work has relied on two opposite assumptions.
Jones (2014a) assumes that all the variation in relative skill efficiency is due to human capital,
that is θQ “ θAQ. Caselli and Coleman (2006) and Caselli and Ciccone (2019) on the other hand
interpret relative skill efficiency as reflecting only the skill bias of technology, with θQ “ 0.
These diverging assumptions led to substantial disagreement on the role of relative human
capital and imperfect substitutability in development accounting.
To illustrate the implications of my estimates of θQ for these debates, I compute (27) using
the micro data from India (P ) and US (R), the poorest and richest countries in the micro data
sample. India’s GDP per worker is 5.7% of the US one, and the estimates for relative human
capital and relative skill efficiency imply the elasticities of θQ “ 0.055 and θAQ “ 1.119,
roughly in line with the sample-wide values in Table III. As in the baseline exercises in Jones
(2014a) and Caselli and Ciccone (2019), I set QL,R{QL,P “ 1, which allows to isolate the
contribution of relative human capital. Table IV displays the results.
[Table IV here]
Implication 1: Small Contribution of Relative Human Capital. Consider first the results
for σ “ 1.5. If, as in Jones (2014a), all the variation in relative skill efficiency is attributed
21As discussed in Jones (2019) and Hendricks and Schoellman (2020), a different thought experiment would be
to assign to the rich country the human capital of the poor country, which is not simply the symmetric counterpart
of the one considered here. Moreover, the magnitude of the contribution of human capital is sensitive to the chosen
threshold for high-skill labor. See Hendricks and Schoellman (2020) for a full comparison of these variants of the
development accounting exercise. Appendix D shows that Implications 1 and 2 discussed below largely apply to
these alternative formulations.
22Appendix D includes a step by step derivation of equation (27). A similar representation is derived in
Hendricks and Schoellman (2020).
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to human capital (θQ “ θAQ), closing the human capital gap would result in an increase in
India’s GDP of a factor of 12, up to 70% of the US level (roughly as Japan). On the other
hand, if θQ “ 0 as in Caselli and Ciccone (2019), the same experiment would result in less
of a doubling of India’s GDP. My estimates imply that only 5% of the relative efficiency gap
between US and India is driven by human capital; this implies a counterfactual ratio only
slightly higher than the one with θQ “ 0, bringing India to 11% of the US GDP (roughly as
Ukraine). While not negligible, the associated gain is small compared to the existing gap, with
relative human capital contributing little to it. As shown in Figure VIII, similar conclusions
apply to all the poorest countries in the micro-data sample, as well as to the (poorer) countries
at the bottom of the GDP distribution in the broad sample.
[Figure VIII here]
It is useful to frame this result in the context of other papers performing development ac-
counting with migration data. In particular, Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) show that wage
gains upon migration are consistent with large gaps in average human capital per worker be-
tween the US and a combination of poorer countries. This variation in average human capital
can be thought of as a composite of uniform and relative differences in human capital across
skill levels. The results above suggest that, on their own, relative differences play a limited role,
in line with the “relative technology” interpretation of the large gaps in relative skill efficiency.
This does not preclude substantial cross-country gaps in human capital, which however require
large uniform differences across skill levels. In their more recent work, Hendricks and Schoell-
man (2020) show that the relative wage gains of high- and low-skill migrants are consistent
with significant human capital gaps for both skill groups and a predominant role of technology
in explaining their relative productivity, consistently with my findings.23
Implication 2: No Amplification from Imperfect Substitutability. Another source of dis-
agreement in the literature is the impact of σ on the development accounting results. Table
IV shows that when θQ “ θAQ departures from perfect substitutability (i.e. a lower σ) greatly
magnify the role of human capital. Intuitively, a lower σ leads to a higher estimated gap in rel-
ative skill efficiency, which is then fully attributed to human capital. On the other hand, Caselli
and Ciccone (2013) show analytically that assuming imperfect substitutability reduces the con-
tribution of human capital when θQ “ 0, as reflected by row (2) of Table IV. In Appendix D I
show that this result extends to any (fixed) value of θQ; for a given estimate of relative human
capital, lower values of σ are associated with lower counterfactual ratios. Row (3) of Table IV
confirms this for my estimate of θQ.
23In previous work, Schoellman (2012) infers a significant variation in the relative human capital associated
with schooling from the Mincerian returns for home-educated immigrants in the US. This conclusion is based
on the calibration of a model of endogenous schooling, through the lens of which the cross-country variation in
schooling quantity is informative on the cross-country variation in the productivity gain associated to an additional
year of schooling (as in equilibrium the former increases the latter). The human capital stocks estimated by
Schoellman (2012) incorporate this variation in relative productivity, which, as discussed in the paper, might in
fact reflect both educational quality and the skill bias of technology.
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In other words, the diverging patterns in Jones (2014a) and Caselli and Ciccone (2019) are
due to conceptually different forces: the impact of σ on the measurement of θQ on one hand,
and on the counterfactual ratio for a given θQ on the other. The migrant-based estimate of θQ is
independent of σ, eliminating the first effect. To further illustrate the interplay between these
two forces, row (4) in Table IV sets the θQ{θAQ ratio implied by the migrant-based calibration,
allowing both θQ and θAQ to vary with σ (but keeping their ratio constant). The resulting
counterfactual ratio increases more slowly with σ compared to row (3), due to a (weak) negative
and counteracting effect of σ on the inferred θQ. Overall, both variants of the migrant-based
calibration in Table IV show that σ does not have a major impact on the development accounting
results, with departures from perfect substitutability mildly reducing the role of human capital.
VI Conclusions
This paper studies how the relative efficiency of high- and low-skill labor varies across coun-
tries. The analysis of micro data for 12 countries at different levels of development shows
that highly educated workers are relatively more efficient in rich countries. This conclusion is
not driven by differences in sectoral composition, incidence of self-employment or returns to
other observable characteristics. The cross-nationality variation in the skill premia of foreign-
educated migrants suggests that differences in the relative human capital endowment of high-
and low-skill workers can account for a small share of these gaps. To a large extent, it is the
productive environment (as opposed to embodied human capital) that makes high-skill labor
relatively more efficient in rich countries.
These accounting results naturally call for a better understanding of the determinants of
the skill bias of of the production technology. The existing literature, building on the theory in
Caselli and Coleman (2006), mostly emphasizes skill availability at the country level as a factor
driving skill-biased technological adoption. In addition, cross-country differences in various
types of institutions, in the way production is organized and tasks are allocated across workers,
and in the prevalence of large and modern corporations might all benefit disproportionately
high-skill workers in rich countries, possibly also contributing to explaining their abundance.
Along the lines of this paper, one likely source of further progress in the quantitative exploration
of these possibilities is the comparative analysis of micro-level data on firms, tasks and workers.
Moreover, the results of this paper are informative for future work on human capital differ-
ences across countries. The small contribution of relative human capital in accounting for gaps
in relative skill efficiency and income per worker does not imply that human capital plays a
small role for economic development. What this result does suggest is that large cross-country
gaps in human capital require large uniform differences across high- and low-educated workers.
This puts important restrictions on theories of human capital accumulation and economic de-
velopment, calling for a stronger emphasis on investments happening early on or outside of the
formal school system. Identifying and quantifying these forms of human capital accumulation
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represent exciting avenues for future research.
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Tables
Table I: Skill Premium, Supply and Efficiency across Countries
No All Working
Baseline Hours Age Traditional
pAHQHq { pAHQHq { pAHQHq { pAHQHq {
Country wH{wL H̃{L̃ pALQLq pALQLq pALQLq pALQLq
India 2.230 0.205 0.041 0.050 0.092 0.040
Indonesia 1.957 0.070 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.006
Jamaica 2.969 0.067 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.003
Brazil 3.419 0.158 0.087 0.121 0.115 0.022
Venezuela 2.490 0.257 0.089 0.132 0.152 0.055
Uruguay 2.218 0.363 0.126 0.189 0.225 0.260
Panama 2.262 0.313 0.099 0.123 0.119 0.077
Mexico 2.205 0.227 0.049 0.069 0.070 0.040
Trinidad and Tobago 2.746 0.100 0.018 0.022 0.024 0.009
Israel 1.606 0.596 0.129 0.155 0.109 0.156
Canada 1.508 1.539 0.711 0.825 0.928 1.628
United States 1.802 1.397 1 1 1 1
Elasticity wrt GDP p.w. -0.138 0.911 1.408 1.366 1.117 1.575
[0.078] [0.244] [0.394] [0.402] [0.414] [0.509]
Notes: The Table shows the skill premium, relative skill supply and efficiency across the countries in the
micro-data sample. Relative skill efficiency is normalised such that it takes value 1 for the United States. No
Hours refers to estimates obtained when not weighting workers by hours worked; All Working Age refers to
estimates obtained when including all working age population irrespective of employment status (and hours
worked); Traditional refers to estimates obtained when using a Mincerian return of 0.10 to impute the skill
premium and calibrate the human capital stocks. The last row shows the coefficient of a regression of the log
of each variable on log GDP per capita (standard errors in brackets).
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Table II: Skill Premium, Supply and Efficiency across Countries - Robustness
θW θH̃{L̃ θAQ
σ “ 1.5 σ “ 1.3 σ “ 2
(1) Baseline -0.138 0.911 1.408 2.439 0.635
[0.078] [0.244] [0.394] [0.666] [0.194]
(2) Experience and Gender -0.024 0.796 1.520 2.549 0.748
[0.086] [0.249] [0.398] [0.673] [0.199]
(3) Baseline (Self-Employment Sample) -0.412 1.413 1.590 2.925 0.589
[0.089] [0.356] [0.633] [1.062] [0.315]
(4) Self-Employment -0.412 1.384 1.533 2.830 0.561
[0.087] [0.366] [0.639] [1.077] [0.315]
(5) Agriculture -0.274 1.459 1.719 2.858 0.770
[0.106] [0.366] [0.466] [0.753] [0.234]
(6) Manufacturing -0.209 0.900 0.952 1.615 0.399
[0.103] [0.272] [0.265] [0.446] [0.126]
(7) Low-Skill Services -0.159 0.843 0.992 1.649 0.444
[0.105] [0.316] [0.359] [0.589] [0.176]
(8) High-Skill Services -0.016 0.530 0.850 1.345 0.438
[0.081] [0.268] [0.360] [0.575] [0.186]
Notes: The Table shows the elasticities of the skill premium, relative skill supply and relative skill efficiency
with respect to GDP per worker (standard errors in brackets). The elasticities are computed using data for the
12 countries in the micro-data sample, with the exceptions of rows (3)-(4) for which only the 8 countries with
self-employment data are used.
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Table III: Relative Human Capital across Countries
Broad Sample (N “ 104) Micro-Data Sample (N “ 12)
θQ θQ{θAQ θQ θQ{θAQ
σ “ 1.5 σ “ 1.3 σ “ 2 σ “ 1.5 σ “ 1.3 σ “ 2
(1) US Immigrants 0.105 0.095 0.057 0.189 0.043 0.030 0.018 0.068
[0.016] [0.048]
(2) All Host Countries 0.098 0.088 0.053 0.176 0.078 0.055 0.032 0.123
[0.016] [0.047]
(3) Bilateral Controls 0.062 0.056 0.034 0.112 0.095 0.067 0.039 0.149
[0.026] [0.087]
Robustness (US Immigrants)
(4) Selection Adjusted 0.039 0.035 0.021 0.070 0.067 0.047 0.027 0.105
[0.026] [0.080]
(5) 10+ Years in US 0.065 0.059 0.035 0.118 0.078 0.055 0.032 0.122
[0.017] [0.060]
(6) English Speakers 0.096 0.087 0.052 0.173 0.039 0.028 0.016 0.061
[0.015] [0.041]
(7) Skill Downgrading 0.072 0.065 0.039 0.130 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.012
[0.014] [0.038]
(8) Sorting (Sectors) 0.094 0.085 0.051 0.170 0.078 0.056 0.032 0.123
[0.012] [0.037]
(9) Sorting (Geographic) 0.101 0.091 0.055 0.182 0.033 0.024 0.014 0.052
[0.016] [0.044]
Notes: The Table shows the elasticity of relative human capital with respect to GDP per capita θQ (standard
errors in brackets) and its ratio with respect to the elasticity of relative skill efficiency θAQ. Each row reports
results from a different methodology (as indicated by the row titles) to estimate the relative human capital
endowment of high-skill labor.
Table IV: Relative Human Capital and Development Accounting - US vs India
Counterfactual Relative GDP (US=1)
σ “ 1.5 σ “ 2 σ “ 4 σ “ 8
Relative Human Capital Interpretation
p1q θQ “ θAQ 0.698 0.289 0.161 0.120
Relative Technology Interpretation
p2q θQ “ 0 0.104 0.112 0.126 0.140
Migrant-Based Calibration
p3q θQ “ 0.055 0.112 0.123 0.140 0.158
p4q θQ “ 0.05ˆ θAQ 0.112 0.117 0.127 0.139
Notes: The Table shows the counterfactual GDP ratio y˚P {yR, where P is India andR is the US, under different
calibrations of the elasticity of relative human capital θQ. For comparison, the actual GDP ratio in the data is
yP {yR “ 0.057.
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8 9 10 11 12
Log GDP p.w.
Notes: The figure plots log relative skill efficiency and log GDP per worker for the 12 countries in the micro-data
sample. Relative skill efficiency is normalized to take value 1 (0 in log) for the United States. The solid line
represents the best linear fit.
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8 9 10 11 12
Log GDP p.w.
High-skill Low-skill
Notes: The figure plots the skill-specific average weekly hours per employed worker (left panel) and employment
rate (right panel) against log GDP per worker for the countries in the micro-data sample. The left panel does not
include India and Panama, as no data on hours worked is available for these countries. The solid (dashed) line
represents the best linear fit for the low-skill (high-skill) group.






















































































































7 8 9 10 11 12
Log GDP p.w.
Notes: The figure plots the log skill premium across US immigrants’ countries of origin, against the log GDP per
worker in the country of origin. The solid line shows the best linear fit.
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8 9 10 11 12
Log GDP p.w.
Notes: The left graph plots the host country fixed effect estimated from from equation (17) against log GDP per
worker. The right graph plots the log skill bias of technology implied by the host country fixed effect against log
GDP per capita. Both the host country fixed effect and the skill bias of technology are normalised such that they
take value 1 (0 in logs) for the United States. The solid lines show the best linear fits.
















1/16 1/16 - 1/8 1/8 - 1/4 1/4 - 1/2 ≥ 1/2
GDP p.w. (US=1)
Notes: The figure plots the measure of differential selection of high-skill (college educated) and low-skill (high
school educated) emigrants from Hendricks and Schoellman (2018), by levels of GDP per worker.
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7 8 9 10 11 12
Log GDP p.w.
Notes: The figure plots the share of high-skill workers employed in low-skill occupations against the log GDP
per worker of the country of education. High-skill workers are defined as workers with at least some tertiary
education. High-skill occupations are defined as occupations where at least 50% of the employed natives are
high-skilled. The solid line represents the best linear fit.

























































10 10.5 11 11.5 12
Log GDP p.w.
Notes: The figure plots the difference between the average PIAAC numeracy score of high-skill (college educated)
and low-skill (high school educated) workers against log GDP per worker in 2014. Scores are standardized to
have an (individual-level) average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 when pooling all countries. The solid line
represents the best linear fit.
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Counterfactual, θQ = θAQ
Counterfactual, θQ = 0
Counterfactual, Migrant-Based Calibration
Notes: The figure plots the actual value (black bars) and various counterfactuals for the GDP per worker ratio with
respect to the US.
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